Identity and Security at Chicago-O’Hare

There is a great deal of talk about identifying individuals as “safe” or “unsafe” to fly aboard American planes. “Safe” individuals may bypass the security line without screening, while those labeled as “unsafe” may be prohibited from flying at all. The idea behind creating such distinctions is that we can single out potential terrorists long before they get to the airport while reducing the amount of inconvenience imposed on patriotic Americans.

This is dubious premise for many reasons, a number of which I have articulated in previous posts. But today, another reason was added to the list. This evening, at Chicago-O’Hare airport, I was given two distinct chances to board an airplane using another person’s identity.

The first opportunity came when - exhausted and frazzled from the hour long train trip from Hyde Park to O’Hare - I mistakenly turned up at the United ticket counter instead of the counter for American. I slid my credit card through the machine and an itinerary for a woman named Tanya Klein appeared on the screen.

Realizing my mistake, I canceled the itinerary and took the train over to the United terminal, where I once again slid my card through the self-service kiosk. This time, the name on the boarding pass that printed was “Thomas Klein.” I didn’t notice the name discrepancy until long after I had passed through airport security. The TSA employee who compared the name on my ID to that on my boarding pass certainly didn’t bat an eyelash at the name / gender goof.

Were I a terrorist in either of these situations, I could have slithered right through security. And if a “safe” list existed, and either Tanya or Thomas Klein’s names appeared on it, I could have done so with a bomb in hand, or shoe, or bag.

Much has been made of instances when someone with a name similar to that of a suspected terrorist has been prohibited from flying. But what about those times when computer and human errors at airports allow people to pass through security and board airplanes using other people’s names? It’s likely that terrorist organizations know about these weaknesses in our defenses.

Instances like this fully illustrate why it’s a terrible idea to create a screening process that relies on external distinctions to determine trustworthiness. But more importantly, it also demonstrates that we have a long way to go before we are truly prepared for another terrorist attack.